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Respondent/Cross-Petitioner is incarcerated 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's claim, all of the issues argued in Garcia's Brief of 
Cross-Petitioner address this Court's "unlawful user" certiorari question and are 
therefore properly before this Court. Specifically, defense counsel adequately 
preserved the issues that are directly and fairly contained within this Court's 
certiorari question, and if not, ineffective assistance of counsel would exist here if 
trial counsel did not argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Garcia 
was an "unlawful user" under a constitutional interpretation of a vague statutory 
phrase. In addition, contrary to the State's claim, there was insufficient evidence 
to show that Garcia was an "unlawful user" when this vague statutory term is 
applied in a constitutional manner that comports with its plain meaning. Lastly, 
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Garcia does not concede any matters not addressed in this reply brief but believes 
that those matters are adequately addressed in his Brief of Cross-Petitioner. See 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (c) ("Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter 
set forth in the opposing brief."). 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in determining that Garcia failed to 
demonstrate that the term "unlawful user" is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to this case. 
The State argues that Garcia's claims are not properly before this Court 
because this Court's certiorari question is not properly before this Court. Br. 
Cross-Resp. at 18-22. The State also argues that even if Garcia's claims are 
properly before this Court, the court of appeals did not err in affirming Garcia's 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person conviction. Id. at 37-41. 
The State is wrong because: A) This Court's certiorari question is properly before 
this Court and all of Garcia's claims are either directly or fairly contained within 
this Court's certiorari question; B) If this Court agrees with the court of appeals 
that Garcia did not adequately preserve his constitutional claim, this Court can 
reach the merits of this claim under Garcia's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim; and C) There was insufficient evidence to show that Garcia was an 
"unlawful user" when this vague statutory term is applied in a constitutional 
manner that comports with its plain meaning. 
2 
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A. This Court's certiorari question is properly before this Court and all 
of Garcia's claims are either directly or fairly contained within this 
Court's certiorari question. 
The State argues that this Court should not decide the merits of Garcia's 
constitutional claim because the Court's certiorari question is not properly before 
this Court. Br. Cross-Resp. at 18-20. The State also argues that the court of 
appeals never decided Garcia's constitutional claim because the court determined 
that defense counsel did not preserve the issue; therefore, the court only decided 
Garcia's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 18-20. The State, however, 
is mistaken because this Court's certiorari question is properly before this Court. 
Furthermore, all of Garcia's arguments in his Brief of Cross-Petitioner are either 
directly or fairly contained within this Court's certiorari question. 
First, Garcia's constitutional claim is properly before this Court because the 
court of appeals' opinion addressed it. In its decision, the court of appeals 
specifically and incorrectly stated that "The Statute is Not Unconstitutionally 
Vague." See Garcia, 2016 UT App 59, 134 (section heading). The court of appeals 
determined that, because it disagreed with Garcia's constitutional argument that 
"unlawful user" should be interpreted as "current user," he was not prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to preserve it. Id. 1J35. In rejecting Garcia's constitutional claim, 
the court of appeals decided that Garcia "points to no cases that limit 'unlawful 
user' to people actually under the influence of a drug at the time they possess a 
firearm. And he neglects to cite to any cases in which such an argument was 
successfully made to a court." Id. Because the court of appeals not only addressed 
3 
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and rejected Garcia's constitutional claim, but did so in a manner that improperly 
informs Utah trial courts that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague in 
situations like Garcia's, this Court's certiorari question is properly before this 
Court. 
Second, all of Garcia's arguments in his Brief of Cross-Petitioner are either 
directly or fairly contained within this Court's certiorari question. "In 
determining the scope of an order granting certiorari," this Court is "guided by 
rule 49(a)(4) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." State v. Leber, 2009 UT 
59, ,f 10, 216 P.3d 964. Rule 49(a)(4) "states that '[o]nly the questions set forth in 
the petition or fairly included therein will be considered by the Supreme Court."' 
Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,I10 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)) (emphasis in 
original). "Questions presented for review within the petition for certiorari 'will 
be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included therein."' Leber, 
2009 UT 59, ,I10 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). "Furthermore, 'this rule 
should be construed broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, 
however peripheral."' Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,I10 (quoting Sevy v. Sec. Title Co., 902 
P.2d 629, 637 (Utah 1995)). 
"Review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of appeals' decision 
and is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the petitions." Coulter & 
Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P .2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998). But this does not limit 
this Court's "power to review questions decided by the district court and not 
reached by the court of appeals, where those questions are fully briefed and fairly 
4 
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included within the issues being decided upon by this court." Nichols v. Jacobsen 
Const. Co., 2016 UT 19, ,I33, 374 P.3d 3 (citing Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). 
This Court granted Garcia's cross-petition for certiorari review on the 
following issue: "Whether the court of appeals erred in determining Cross-
petitioner failed to demonstrate that the term unlawful user in Section 58-37-2 of 
the Utah Code is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his case." Order, dated 
September 29, 2016. 1 Garcia's Brief of Cross-Petitioner argues that the court of 
appeals did, in fact, err because it failed to interpret and apply the vague statutory 
term "unlawful user" in a manner that comports with its plain meaning and in a 
manner that is consistent with constitutional protections. See Br. Cross-Pet. at 
30-50; Utah Code §§76-10-503(1)(b)(iii),58-37-2. Moreover, Garcia argues, and 
previously argued before the court of appeals, that this issue was preserved by 
defense counsel's directed verdict motion. Br. Cross-Pet. at 46-47; R.555:129-34; 
see also State v. Garcia, 2016 UT App 59, ,16. Garcia also argues that the court of 
appeals erred in determining that he had failed to prove prejudice for his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Br. Cross-Pet. at 48-50; Garcia, 2016 UT 
App 59, ,I,134-38. A proper interpretation and application of "unlawful user" 
shows that there was insufficient evidence to support that Garcia was an 
"unlawful user" of a controlled substance. Utah Code §76-10-503(1)(b)(iii). 
1 As pointed out in the State's brief, the term "unlawful user" is not found in 
Section 58-37-2 of the Utah Code. Br. Cross-Resp. at 12. Rather, as applied to this 
case, the term "unlawful user" is found in Section 76-10-503(1)(b)(iii) of the Utah 
Code. 
5 
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Ultimately, all of these arguments are either directly or fairly contained within 
this Court's certiorari question because they address this Court's constitutional 
question regarding "unlawful user" as well the corresponding subsidiary 
questions that are related to this issue (i.e. preservation and ineffective assistance 
of counsel). See Order, dated September 29, 2016; Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,I10; 
Nichols, 2016 UT 19, ,I33. 
Contrary to the State's argument, just because the court of appeals decided 
that Garcia did not preserve the constitutional claim does not mean that this 
issue was not properly before the court of appeals, or that this Court is bound by 
the appellate court's decision regarding preservation. See State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, ,I25, 63 P .3d 650 (this Court reviews the decisions of the court of appeals 
for correctness); see also Eaton Kenway, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 906 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1995) (stating that "'[t]his [C]ourt is never 
bound by decisions of the court of appeals and does not need to overcome any 
particular hurdles in overruling them."') (citation omitted). 
In sum, this Court's certiorari question is properly before this Court. 
Furthermore, this Court can reach Garcia's constitutional claim because it is 
directly, or at a minimum, "fairly included", Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,I10, within this 
Court's certiorari question and this Court is not bound by the court of appeals' 
decision that Garcia did not preserve this issue. See Order, dated September 29, 
2016; Leber, 2009 UT 59, ,I10. Thus, in the interests of judicial economy and 
because Garcia's arguments are directly or fairly contained within this Court's 
6 
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certiorari question, this Court should address the merits of Garcia's 
constitutional claim. 
B. If this Court agrees with the court of appeals that Garcia did not 
adequately preserve his constitutional claim, this Court can reach the 
merits of this claim under Garcia's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. 
According to the State, because Garcia cannot point to any case law that 
has yet to implement an interpretation of "unlawful user" as meaning someone 
who is using a controlled substance at the time he or she is in possession of the 
firearm, Garcia cannot prove that his counsel performed unreasonably. Br. Cross-
Resp. at 27-28. The State argues "Garcia's trial counsel was only obligated to 
argue existing law, not advocate for new law." Id. at 28. The State is mistaken 
because the United States Constitution was existing law, and it would have been 
unreasonable for defense counsel to not advocate for pertinent issues that have 
not yet been settled by Utah law (i.e., the appropriate constitutional application 
of the vague statutory term "unlawful user."). Utah Code §§76-10-503(1)(b)(iii), 
58-37-2; see also Br. Cross-Pet. at 34-36 (addressing the various constitutional 
problems that arise if Utah courts apply a broad interpretation of "unlawful user" 
in outlining the temporal nexus requirements of any drug use and weapon 
possession). 
Defense counsel is tasked with a number of duties. Defense counsel has a 
duty to "'adequately investigate"' the law. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,,I69, 152 
P.3d 321 (citation omitted); State v. Lenkart, 2011 UT 27, 127, 262 P.3d 1. 
7 
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Counsel must also make use of important defense evidence and object to 
inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 2012 UT 62, ,r,r7-9, 289 P.3d 487 
(counsel performed deficiently when he failed to use important defense evidence 
that he had access to); State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ,r23, 285 P.3d 1183 
(failure to object to ambiguity in jury instructions constituted deficient 
performance). 
Counsel's duty also extends to investigating and arguing issues that have 
not yet been settled by Utah law. In State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ,r,rn-21, 179 P.3d 
792, this Court held that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize 
an error even though Utah case law had not yet spoken on the issue. Specifically, 
"counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the absence of a jury instruction 
identifying a tax deficiency as an element of' Utah's tax evasion statute. Id. ,r14. 
And "[a]lthough [the] statute [did] not use the words 'tax deficiency', it [was] 
logical to conclude that, if no tax is owing, there is no tax to evade." Id. ,rn. 
(emphasis added). Likewise, in State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26, 132, 135 P.3d 864, this 
Court held that counsel performed deficiently even though the issue presented 
an "open question" in Utah because "competent counsel would scour the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule in search of a means" to get the evidence admitted. 
Id. ,r32 (emphasis added). 
In short, the question in this case is not whether counsel was obligated to 
only argue existing law, as is argued by the State. Br. Cross-Resp. at 28. Rather, 
the question is whether counsel's arguable failure to object to a constitutional 
8 
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interpretation and application of a vague statutory phrase "unlawful user" 
constituted a reasonable strategy. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 
(Utah 1993) ("if the challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial 
strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel"). Here, 
there would be no sound strategy for defense counsel to not "scour" the United 
States Constitution in arguing that it is "logical to conclude" that there cannot be 
an unconstitutional application of the vague statutory term "unlawful user" even 
if Utah case law has not yet spoken on this issue. See Eyre, 2008 UT 16, ,In; Ison, 
2006 UT 26, ,I32; Utah Code §§76-10-503(1)(b)(iii),58-37-2. Thus, this Court can 
reach the merits of Garcia's constitutional claim under his ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. Furthermore, ineffective assistance of counsel would exist here 
if trial counsel did not argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that 
Garcia was an "unlawful user" under a constitutional interpretation of a vague 
statutory phrase. Utah Code §§76-10-503(1)(b)(iii),58-37-2. 
C. There was insufficient evidence to show that Garcia was an "unlawful 
user" when this vague statutory term is applied in a constitutional 
manner that comports with its plain meaning. 
Garcia's Brief of Cross-Petitioner argues that in applying a constitutional 
and narrow interpretation of "unlawful user" to mean someone who is actually 
using a controlled substance at the time he or she is in possession of the firearm, 
there was insufficient evidence to support Garcia's firearm conviction. Br. Cross-
Pet. at 44-45. In the alternative, even under the federal circuits' standard, which 
requires "recency of [drug] use" and that the use be proximate to or 
9 
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contemporaneous with the possession of a firearm, there was insufficient 
evidence to support Garcia's firearm conviction. Id. at 45-46. 
The State appears to acknowledge that the federal definition of "unlawful 
user" is correct. Br. Cross-Resp. at 40. In other words, the State concedes that the 
statute would be vague unless "it is defined to require use 'sufficiently consistent 
and prolonged as to constitute a pattern of regular and repeated use ... during a 
period that reasonably covers the time a firearm was possessed."' Id. (quoting 
United States v. Burchard, 580 F.3d 341 ( 6th Cir. 2009)). The State argues, 
however, that an application of the federal standard to the facts of this case shows 
that Garcia was an "unlawful user" because "Garcia admitted that he []started 
using cocaine in 2006 [] [a]nd nothing in Garcia's statements even begin to 
suggest that Garcia had since stopped." Id. at 37. The State is mistaken. 
Garcia's confession to "sometimes" using cocaine "since 2006" was 
insufficient to show that he was a regular user of cocaine when he possessed the 
gun on or about June 30, 2010. See State's Ex.21. Indeed, the confession is 
consistent with Garcia having used cocaine once or twice since 2006. It is also 
consistent with him not having used cocaine for a year or more. That would 
hardly constitute regular, ongoing cocaine use at a time proximate to Garcia's 
weapon possession. Moreover, Garcia specifically informed a detective that he 
keeps his gun close by when he is "off cocaine," which indicates periods of time 
when Garcia is not using cocaine, and most importantly, suggests that Garcia was 
not using cocaine on June 30, 2010. See id. Thus, contrary to the State's claim, 
10 
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Garcia's statements to a detective indicated that he did not have ongoing cocaine 
use since 2006 and that he specifically chooses to possess a weapon when he is 
not using drugs. See id. And even if Garcia's statements are interpreted as him 
confessing to sometimes simultaneously possessing a gun and using cocaine, this 
does not prove that he was a regular user of cocaine when he possessed the gun 
on June 30, 2010. See State v. Simmons, 759 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 & n.2 (Utah 
1988) (holding that the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of rape 
for conduct that allegedly occurred "on or about the 5th day of May, 1985," even 
though there was "ample evidence of other incidents of rape committed upon the 
same victim"). 
The State unpersuasively attempts to distinguish United States v. Doughty, 
No. 2:09-CR-62-WKW [WO], 2009 WL 2132701 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 2009) 
(unpublished), on the ground that Garcia used the present tense regarding his 
drug use and the defendant in Doughty used the past tense. Br. Cross-Resp. at 
34. But the defendant in Doughty did not use the past tense. See Doughty, 2009 
WL 2132701, at *1. The court's decision used the past tense when paraphrasing 
the defendant's confession because the court was referring to events in the 
past. See id. (stating that when the defendant spoke to a police officer, he 
"allegedly responded that he smoked marijuana for his back problems.") 
(emphasis added). If the defendant had used the past tense, the court would have 
used the pluperfect or past perfect tense to paraphrase his confession (i.e. "that 
he had smoked marijuana" as opposed to "he smoked marijuana"). 
11 
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Ultimately, Garcia's statements lacked any indication of regular, ongoing, 
and recent drug use that was proximate in time to his weapon possession. See Br. 
of Cross-Pet. at 41-42; Cf. United States v. Torres-Rivera, Criminal No. 15-481 
(PAD), 2016 WL 3024061, at *2, *3 (D. P.R. May 24, 2016) (unpublished) 
(defendant was an "unlawful user" because he admitted to smoking marijuana on 
a weekly basis, dependent upon how often he could get it); United States v. 
Holmes, No. 15-CR-129, 2016 WL 54918, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 5, 2016) 
(unpublished) (defendant was an "unlawful user" where he "admitted in a post-
arrest statement that he habitually smoked marijuana for the past four years, that 
he smoked marijuana at least a couple of times per day, and that he smoked 
marijuana earlier on the day he was arrested.") (footnote omitted); United States 
v. Marceau, 554 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (defendant was an "unlawful user" 
where he told an officer that he "had smoked marijuana daily in the days before 
[he possessed weapons in a] robbery, stopping only when he exhausted his 
supply ... "). 
In sum, the court of appeals erred in affirming Garcia's third degree 
conviction for possession of a firearm by a restricted person because it failed to 
interpret the vague statutory phrase "unlawful user" in a constitutional manner 
that comports with its plain meaning. In addition, when applying a constitutional 
interpretation of "unlawful user" to this case, there was insufficient evidence to 
support Garcia's possession of a firearm charge. The appellate court's decision to 
affirm the firearm conviction therefore provides trial courts with unclear, 
12 
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incorrect, and unfair guidance in interpreting and applying the phrase "unlawful 
user" in a constitution manner that comports with its plain meaning. See Utah 
Code §§76-10-503(1)(b)(iii),58-37-2. Thus, this Court should reverse the court of 
appeals' ruling that affirmed Garcia's conviction for possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above and in Garcia's Brief of Respondent and Cross-
petitioner, Garcia respectfully requests that this Court affirm the court of appeals' 
ruling reversing his attempted murder conviction due to an erroneous and 
prejudicial jucy instruction regarding the relationship between attempted 
manslaughter and imperfect self-defense. Garcia further requests that this Court 
reverse the court of appeals' ruling that affirmed Garcia's possession of a weapon 
by a restricted person. 
SUBMITIED this 5+'1 day of April, 2017. 
TERESA l.WELCH 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner 
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